Month: February 2022

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICARDO MENDOZA

G.R. No. 39275: December 20 1933: 59 Phil. 163

Offense Involved: Direct Assault (Article 148, Revised Penal Code)

FACTS:  On or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Ricardo Mendoza, a student slapped his teacher Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the premises of the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity. The provincial fiscal then filed an information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority. However, the trial court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light felony. Hence this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the information against the defendant-appellee of Direct Assault upon a person in authority?

HELD:

  1. No. The trial court did not err in dismissing the information of Direct Assault upon a person in authority against the defendant. A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the necessary requisite thereof prescribed by law. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A teacher is neither a person in authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore, the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the performance of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in authority nor an agent thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO PRIETO

G.R. No. L-399: January 29 1948: 80 Phil. 138

Offense Involved: Treason

FACTS: On March, 1945, the accused Eduardo Prieto with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. The other witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused struck the flier with a piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos. Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The trial court then prosecuted accused-appellant for seven counts of Treason. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine. Aggrived, accused-appellant filed this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant for Treason?

HELD:

  1.  Yes. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant for Treason.  Eduardo Prieto is not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. The court held that the evidence of the prosecution does not satisfy the required two-witness rule. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. It added that the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.

REPUBLIC VS. MANALO

G.R. No. 221029 : April 24 2018

Related Provision: Article 26, Par. 2, FC

Facts:

  • Manalo married Minoro (Japanese) in the Philippines.
  • 2011, Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan. It was approved.
  • 2012, Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry by virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
  • RTC denied Manalo’s petition for lack of merit. It ruled that that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code.
    • It said that the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.”
  • CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the FC is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
    • meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
  • SG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that Manalo’s petition should be granted by virtue of Art. 26 (Par 2), FC?

HELD: NO. CA did not err in ruling that Manalo’s petition should be granted by virtue of Art. 26 (Par 2), FC?

  • Manalo’s petition is granted.
  • CA ruling partially affirm.
  1. A Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
    1. Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn
  2. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

G.R. No. 154380 : October 5 2005

Related Provision: Article 26, Par. 2, FC

FACTS:

  • 1981, Obrecido married Villanueva (both Filipino) in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter
  • 1986, Villanueva left for the United States bringing along their son.
  • A few years later, Obrecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
  • 2000, Obrecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married Stanley where they lived in California.
  • Obrecido thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26, FC. It is a declaratory relief
  • No opposition was filed. RTC ruled in favor of Obrecido, declaring him to be capacitated to remarry.
  • SolGon filed an MR but RTC denied.
  • SolGon filed a Petition for Review to assail the RTC Decision raising pure question of law.

ISSUE: WON RTC erred in ruling that Obrecido is capacitated to remarry by virtue of Article 26, Par. 2, FC?

HELD: NO. RTC did not err in ruling that Obrecido is capacitated to remarry by virtue of Article 26, Par. 2, FC.

  • Obrecido is capacitated to remarry.
  • RTC ruling sustained.
  1. Legislative intent is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.



In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

  • Applying the rule of reason, Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

DISPOSITIVE: Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

ROBERT SAN PEDRO VS. WILLY ONG

G.R. NO. 177598 : October 17 2008

Related Topic: Indispensable party, necessary party

  • 1996, San Pedro purchased from the spouses Narciso parcels of land evidenced by Deeds of Sale.
  • San Pedro hired the services of Dela Pena who is known to be very familiar with the intricacies of real property transfers.
  • San Pedro inquired with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan as to the status of his application for the issuance in his name of new TCTs for the subject properties.
  • He was surprised to find out, however, that the subject properties were still registered in the names of the Narciso spouses and were mortgaged to Willy Ong.
  • 1999, San Pedro filed a Petition for Nullification of Mortgage with Damages against the spouses Narciso, Dela Pena, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes.
    • In order to free the subject properties from the said encumbrances
  • RTC issued summons to spouses Narciso, Dela Peña, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes, directing them to file their Answers to San Pedro’s Petition
  • Caballes and Ong raised in their Joint Answerthe defense of mortgagee-in-good-faith. They claimed that they both relied in good faith on the SPAs granting Dela Peña.
  • RTC: Ruled in favor of San Pedro.
    • San Pedo is the legal and rightful owner of lands.
    • Mortgages constituted over the subject properties in Ong’s favor is null and void
    • SPA in favor of Dela Pena is null and void
    • Ordering the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan to cancel the recordings of mortgages in favor of Ong
    • Ordering [Ong] to return to [San Pedro] the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
  • Ong and Caballes filed an appeal to CA assigning as error the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of Dela Pena which rendered all the proceedings held before said court fatally defective.
  • CA: Reversed RTC ruling on the ground that service of summons on Dela Peña was invalid; thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Since Dela Peña was an indispensable party to the controversy, without her no final determination of the case can be had.
  • San Pedro filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before SC.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in finding Dela Peña as an indispensable party (which served as the basis of its dismissal of San Pedro’s complaint)?

HELD: YES. CA erred in finding Dela Peña as an indispensable party.

  • Dela Peña is not an indispensable party.
  • the crux of the controversy is the title of San Pedro to the subject properties vis-à-vis that of Ong, for the determination of which, Dela Peña’s participation is not an absolute necessity.
  • Her presence in the proceedings before the RTC would have only permitted complete relief since the said court could have already determined therein her liability for the damages she had caused to any of the parties, but it does not make her presence indispensable.
  • Hence, the proceedings held before RTC is valid.
  • RTC decision is reinstated with modifications (portion ordering Adora Dela Pena to pay Willy G. Ong the sum of P245,000.00 plus legal interest, is deleted)

NEWSWEEK VS. IAC

G.R. No. L-63559 : May 30 1986

Topic: Class suit

Facts:

  • Private respondents filed a Complaint for damages for 1M. The criminal complaint for libel was filed separately against Newsweek.
    • Private  respondents,  incorporated  associations  of  sugarcane  planters  in  Negros  Occidental filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province  against  Newsweek  Inc.  and  two  of  their  non-resident  correspondents/reporters,  Fred Bruning and Barry Came. 
    • The  complaint  alleged  that  petitioner  committed  libel  against  them  by  the  publication  of  the article  “An  Island  of  Fear”  in  their  magazine. 
    • The  article  supposedly  portrayed  the  island  as  a place  dominated  by  big  landowners  or  sugarcane  planters  who  exploited  the  impoverished sugarcane  laborers  and  brutalized  and  killed  them  with  impunity. 
    • They  claim  that  the  article showed  a  malicious  use  of  falsehood,  slanted  presentation    and  misrepresentation  of  facts, putting them in a bad light
  • They are comprised of 8,500 (number is complied with)
  • Newsweek, is a foreign corporation who publishes weekly magazine, filed a Motion to Dismiss for libel.
  • CFI Bacolod denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel.
  • IAC affirmed CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel.

ISSUE/S:

  1. WON IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel?
  2. WON the case is a class suit?

HELD:

  1. YES. IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel.
    • Private respondent’s Complaint for libel against Newsweek is dismissed.
  2. NO. The case not a class suit.
    • They do not have common or general interest in the subject matter (each other’s reputation)).
    • It is not a case where one or more may sure for the benefit of all. Or where the representation of class interest affected by the decree is indispensable to make each member an actual party.
    • In this case, the plaintiffs, have separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the controversy.
    • The disputed portion of the article that thet claim to be libelous never singled out plaintiff SOLA as a sugar planter. The report merely stated that the vicime has been arrested by members of special polic unit brought into the area by SOLA, the mayor of Kabankalan.
    • The report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm or privilege ans is proteted by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

FIRST SARMIENTO VS. PBCOM

G.R. No. 202836 : June 19 2018

Topic: Incapable of pecuniary estimation

Facts:

  • 2002, First Sarmiento obtained a P40M loan from PBCOM secured by a REM
  • First Sarmiento failed to pay the loan despite several demands.
  • 2006 PBCOM then filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of REM a recourse granted under the loan agreement.
  • 2011, First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of REM. However, the clerk did not accept it because of failure to attach tax declarations which shall be used to assess the value of property
  • First Sarmiento filed an Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation, and ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
  • 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of REM, with prayer for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction
  • In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order), PBCOM asserted that RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento’s Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the mortgaged properties.
  • RTC dismissed complaint for lack of jurisdiction
  • First Sarmiento filed an MR, but RTC dismissed
  • 2012, First Sarmiento filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 (question of law), insisting that its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: WON RTC erred in ruling that Complaint for annulment of REM is one of pecuniary estimation?

HELD: Yes. RTC erred in ruling that Complaint for annulment of REM is one of pecuniary estimation.

  • Complaint for annulment of REM is NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION.
  • If the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
  • Here, the principal action of First Sarmiento is to annul the REM. It does not seek to recover a sum of money or real property.
  • Hence, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. RTC has jurisdiction.
  • Case is ordered REMANDED to Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan for continued trial on First Sarmiento’s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its amendments.