Month: February 2022

MANOTOC vs. CA

G.R. No. 130974 : August 16 2006

Topic: Valid substituted service of summons

FACTS:

  • Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment (Hawaii) in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207
    • for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
  • Manotoc is the defendant in Civil Case which seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment (Hawaii).
  • Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons to petitioner at Alexandra Homes.
  • Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier.
  • When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order.
  • 1993, Manotoc filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.
    • The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
  • 1994, RTC rejected Manotoc’s Motion To Dismiss. It relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
  • 1997, CA dismissed Manotoc’s Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (which sought to annull RTC Orders). It upheld RTC’s decision.
    • According to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court.
  • Manotoc filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45. He claimed that CA should have annulled the proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service of summons.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in holding that there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction?

HELD:

YES. CA erred in holding that there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction.

  • Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
  • In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person.
  • If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.”
  • Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
  • Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
  • Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
  • The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons out that “[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing.”

LACSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 128096 : January 20 1999

Topic: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

  • Eleven people alleged to be part of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime group known for bank robberies, were killed by anti-bank robbery and intelligence task force personnel (ABRITG). Petitioners and petitioner-intervenors were among those included in the ABRITG.
  • In response to a media report by SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command that the incident was a summary execution rather than a shoot-out between Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto convened a panel of investigators to look into the matter. The incident was determined to be a lawful police operation by the panel. However, a review board overturned the panel’s decision and suggested that twenty-six respondents be prosecuted with multiple murder, including the petitioner, who was charged as the principal, and the petitioner-intervenors, who were charged as accessories.
  • The Ombudsman filed amended information before the Sandiganbayan after a re-investigation, in which petitioner was only charged as an accessory.
  • The defendants filed separate motions challenging the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, claiming that under the modified informations, the cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
    • They argue that the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is limited to instances involving one or more “primary accused” who are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. As a result, they did not meet the requirements. However, until their motions are resolved, R.A. 8249, which modifies the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by removing the word “principal” from the phrase “primary accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
  • The petitioner calls into doubt the legality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, includes Section 7, which states that the legislation would apply to all matters pending in any court that have not commenced trial as of the date of approval.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case. NO. Lacking proof.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute. NO. Applied to all pending cases.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction. NO. Not in the exercise of duty.

HELD:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

JAIME J. ARAZA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 247429: September 08 2020

Offense Involved: Anti-Violence Against Women and Children

FACTS: On October 5, 1989, AAA married Araza. Initially and at the onset of their marriage, her husband Araza was hardworking, loving and faithful. She had no marital issues with Araza until he went to Zamboanga City in February 2007, for their networking business. It was at this point that she began to notice Araza’s change in behavior. One day, she received a text telling that her husband is having an affair with their best friend. She went to see it for herself and was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman, a certain Tessie Luy Fabillar. She instituted a complaint against her husband Araza and his alleged mistress, for Concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza again lived with AAA. However, it was only for a short time. Without saying a word, Araza left AAA on November 22, 2007. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again. In the days to come, she would receive text messages from her husband’s supposed mistress using various numbers. The messages would tell her that Araza is sick and needed money for medicines. There was also another text message threatening her that she will kill AAA’s husband. Because of this, she sought legal services believing that Araza’s liberty was being restrained by Fabillar. Based on the investigation, Araza left their conjugal abode on his own volition and he has been living with his mistress, as husband and wife. As a matter of fact, three children were born out of their cohabitation. The truth caused AAA emotional and psychological suffering. An information for crime of violence against women under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 was filed in RTC Las Pinas City. RTC ruled in favor of AAA. This was affirmed by the CA. Aggrieved, Aaraza filed this present case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 although his conviction was based on facts not alleged in the Information?
  2. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the acts allegedly committed by Araza?

HELD:

  1. No. The elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were sufficiently alleged in the Information. In this case the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender Araza; (2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering is inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and had three illegitimate children with her.
  • No. The CA was correct in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering. The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BULU CHOWDURY

G.R. No. 129577-80: February 15 2000

Offense Involved: Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

FACTS: Sometime in 1994, Sasis, Calleja, and Miranda applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for employment in South Korea. Bulu Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview, Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment and required him to pass the necessary documents and pay the processing fees which were collected by Josephine Ong.  Chowdury was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The complainants also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already expired. For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency’s President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency’s Managing Director. The trial Court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in largescale. Aggrieved,  Chowdury filed this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not trial court erred in finding Chowdury guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale?

HELD:

  1. Yes. Trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Chowdury is not guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade’s failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Their payments were received by the agency’s cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335: February 18 2014

Topic: Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012

FACTS: On September 12, 2012, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 was approved. The law aimed to address legal issues concerning online interactions and the Internet in the Philippines. It penalizes illegal acts done via the Internet that were not covered by old laws. However, the act received criticisms for its provision criminalizing libel, which is perceived to be a curtailment of the freedom of expression. Hence, consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court to question the constitutionality of several provisions of the act. Focusing on the libel aspect, petitioners claim that the libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel, insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article, is constitutional?

HELD:

  1. Yes. Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel is constitutional. The Court ruled that Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. It explained that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.  The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.

MIRIAM ARMI JAO YU VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 134172: September 20 2004

Offense Involved: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22

FACTS: Miriam Armi Jao Yu issued nineteen checks to the prejudice of Susan Andaya. Aggrieved, Susan Andaya filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with nineteen counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision finding her guilty of the charges and imposing upon her hefty fines, indemnities, and subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine in each of the cases and to pay the costs of suit.  Miriam Armi Jao Yu filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals arguing that an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may not be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision. Hence this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court?

HELD:

  1. Yes. An accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the RPC. The absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations. Moreover, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 which clarified the imposition of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the fine he is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the Circular states that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court, “there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.”

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 141066: February 17 2005: 492 Phil. 60

Offense Involved: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22

FACTS: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became regular customers in the pawnshop business of complainant Alfredo Oculam. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses. Obtained three loans from him, guaranteed by three post-dated United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Checks. The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason ‘closed account’. When the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Alfredo Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them. Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature.  RTC rendered a decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico filed for a probation which was granted, while Evangeline Ladonga elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. Hence this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22?
  2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22?

HELD:

  1. No. The Court of Appeals did not err in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
  • Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty because conspiracy was not proven. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. In this case, the elements of the crim. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

ELVIRA YU OH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125297: June 6 2003: 451 Phil. 380

Offense Involved: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22

FACTS: Elvira Yu Oh bought jewelry from private respondent, Solid Gold International Traders but failed to pay purchase price. The parties then entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner was to issue ninety-nine postdated checks amounting to P50,000 each to be deposited every 15th and 30th of the month from October 1990 to November 16, 1994. Petitioner issued 10 checks amounting to P50,000 each, drawn against her account in Equitable Banking Corporation. However, when the manager deposited the checks with Far East Bank and Trust Company, the checks were dishonored as the account was already closed. This prompted the private respondent to file a complaint for B.P. 22. RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of ten counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the CA but it found it to be of no merit and affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in convicting petitioner of ten counts of B.P. 22?
  2. Whether or not the appellate erred in not giving retroactive effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC?

HELD: 

  1. Yes. The appellate court erred in convicting petitioner of ten counts of B.P 22. The liability of the petitioner was not established because the prosection was not able to present the notice of dishonor to the drawer. In cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. Since service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. Basic also is the doctrine that in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for cases of B.P.. 22 there should be clear proof of notice.
  • No. The appellate court did not err in not giving retroactive effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC.  Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application to the case at bar. A penal law, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment. R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case. R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years. Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive. Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, and once acquired, jurisdiction is not affected by subsequent legislative enactments placing jurisdiction in another tribunal; in this case, the RTC was vested with jurisdiction to try petitioner’s cases when the same were filed in October 1992; at that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not yet effective. In so far as the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7691 is concerned, that same is limited only to pending civil cases that have not reached pre-trial stage as provided for in Section 7 thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA

G. R. No. 148233: June 08 2004: 475 PHIL 190

Offense Involved: Anti-Carnapping Law

FACTS: Sometime in1996, Edwin Cipriano hired the accused, Luisito Bustinera, as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer. They agreed that Bustinera would drive the taxi from 6:00 am to 11:00 pm, and would return it to the garage and remit the boundary of P780.00 per day. However, on Dec. 25, 1996, the accused reported for work but did not return the taxi on the same day. On the following day, Cipriano went to Bustinera’s house but did not find the taxi there. The wife of the accused also informed Cipriano that his husband has not yet returned. Cipriano then went to report his missing taxi. It was only on January 9, 1997 where the taxi was recovered after the wife of the accused informed Cipriano that the said taxi was abandoned on Regalado street, Quezon City. In his defense, accused admitted that he did not return the taxi on December 25 as he was short on the boundary fee. However, he posited that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer P2,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997. After trial, the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether RPC or Anti-Carnapping is applicable in this case?
  2. Whether or not accused-appellant violated the Anti-Carnapping Law?

HELD: 

  1. Anti-Carnapping is applicable in this case. Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act Preventing And Penalizing Carnapping.” When statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
  • Yes. Accused-appellant violated the Anti-Carnapping Law. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of carnapping, to wit: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. The argument of the defense that there was no intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi to its garage holds no merit. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA

G.R. No. 186227: July 20 2011: 669 Phil. 461

Offense Involved: R.A. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

FACTS: Sometime in 2003, the Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that a 17 yrs old named Mantalaba was selling shabu. A buy-bust operation was conducted in  the evening of October 1, 2003. After this, two informations were filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. During arraignment, Mantalaba pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu, and for illegally possessing shabu. Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

ISSUE/S:       

  1. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of drug trafficking and possession?
  2. Whether or not lower court erred in disregarding accused-appellant’s minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty?

HELD:

  1. No. Lower court did not err in convicting accused-appellant Mantalaba of drug trafficking and possession. Prosecution was able to establish the evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer, as well as the chain of custody of the seized shabu. The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
  • Yes. Lower court erred in disregarding accused-appellant’s minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. The Court of Appeals must have appreciated Mantalaba’s minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.