Case Digests

ARISTOTLE N. VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. NO.  160188: June 21 2007: 552 Phil. 381

Offense Involved: Theft (Article 308,, RPC)

FACTS: On May 19, 1994, petitioner Aristotle Valenzuelaand Calderon were seen outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),” moving a push cart with cases of detergent of Tide products. Petitioner was then seen unloading these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuelathen returned inside the supermarket, and went out with more cartons of Tide products which he again unloaded to the same area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of said date when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.  Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner Valenzuelaargued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA, however, affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of appellant for Consummated Theft?

HELD: No. The CA did not err in sustaining the conviction of appellant for Consummated Theft. The crime is consummated. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. The court eneunciated that as long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. In conjunction, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, the Court concluded that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPH ORILLA

G.R. Nos. 148939-40: February 13 2004

Offense Involved: Qualified Rape (Article 266-B, RPC)

FACTS: On September 12, 1996, around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms of their house located at Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body and found appellant Joseph Orilla on top of her. Appellant continuously pinned down Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free herself from appellant but her efforts proved futile. Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced Remilyn Orilla’s legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. With a knife pointed at her, Remilyn Orilla was powerless. Appellant warned her not to make a noise. Frightened, Remilyn Orilla just kept silent. Around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of that same day, Remilyn Orilla reported to her sister, Evelyn Catabay, what appellant did to her. Immediately, they went to report it to the authorities. For his defense, Joseph Orilla posited his alibi that he was in Sitio Olo, Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan when the incident took place. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City found appellant guilty of qualified rape. Aggrived, the appelant filed this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding appellant guilty of qualified rape despite the prosecution’s failure to include the age of the accused in the Amended Information?

HELD:

  1. Yes. The trial court erred in holding appellant guilty of qualified rape despite the prosecution’s failure to include the age of the accused.  The prosecution went through the trouble of amending the Information to allege that Remilyn is the “younger sister” of appellant to emphasize the qualified nature of the rape. However, the Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The prosecution’s failure to allege specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its qualified form. Since the Amended Information failed to inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death.

RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 165483: September 12 2006: 533 Phil. 169

Offense Involved: Homicide (Article 249, RPC)

FACTS: On January 16, 1998, brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, “My Way”, Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented this, approached the brother and said in Pangasinan dialect “As if you are tough guys. You are already insulting me in that way.”  Jaime struck Servillano’s head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Ferdinand sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder. The police came and took the Ferrer brothers to Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan. Informations were filed for homicide. frustrated homicide and COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. Uppon arraignment, Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of “Not Guilty”. The RTC found Rujjeric guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide but acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him. The case was appealed, but the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on the ground of lawful self- defense.
  2. Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in sustaining accused-appelant’s conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

  1. No. Court of Appeals did not err in not acquitting accused-appellant on the ground of lawful self- defense. The elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability were not present in this case. It is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the Ferrer brothers. the petitioner’s act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly stated by the trial court, petitioner’s gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
  • No. Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining accused-appelant’s conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In the present case, there is no compelling reason to deviate from their findings. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an acquittal on the ground of lawful self-defense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVADOR TULAGAN

G.R. No. 227363: March 12 2019

Offense Involved: Rape

FACTS: Sometime in September 2011, AAA, nine (9) years old was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her grandmother’s house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part. AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan’s house, he brought her to his house and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties. He also undressed himself, kissed AAA’s cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. For the defense, Tulagan claimed that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA’s house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with AAA’s grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter. The Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.  Upon appeal, the CA affirmed Tulagan’s conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape. Aggrieved, Tulagan filed this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the lower court erred in sustaining accused-appelant’s conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

  1. No. The lower court erred in sustaining his conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Jurisprudence holds that a witness’ testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness’ credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. The fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan’s hands. AAA’s account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a conviction of rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICARDO MENDOZA

G.R. No. 39275: December 20 1933: 59 Phil. 163

Offense Involved: Direct Assault (Article 148, Revised Penal Code)

FACTS:  On or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Ricardo Mendoza, a student slapped his teacher Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the premises of the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity. The provincial fiscal then filed an information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority. However, the trial court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light felony. Hence this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the information against the defendant-appellee of Direct Assault upon a person in authority?

HELD:

  1. No. The trial court did not err in dismissing the information of Direct Assault upon a person in authority against the defendant. A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the necessary requisite thereof prescribed by law. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A teacher is neither a person in authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore, the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the performance of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in authority nor an agent thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO PRIETO

G.R. No. L-399: January 29 1948: 80 Phil. 138

Offense Involved: Treason

FACTS: On March, 1945, the accused Eduardo Prieto with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. The other witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused struck the flier with a piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos. Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The trial court then prosecuted accused-appellant for seven counts of Treason. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine. Aggrived, accused-appellant filed this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant for Treason?

HELD:

  1.  Yes. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant for Treason.  Eduardo Prieto is not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. The court held that the evidence of the prosecution does not satisfy the required two-witness rule. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. It added that the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.

REPUBLIC VS. MANALO

G.R. No. 221029 : April 24 2018

Related Provision: Article 26, Par. 2, FC

Facts:

  • Manalo married Minoro (Japanese) in the Philippines.
  • 2011, Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan. It was approved.
  • 2012, Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry by virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
  • RTC denied Manalo’s petition for lack of merit. It ruled that that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code.
    • It said that the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.”
  • CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the FC is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
    • meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
  • SG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that Manalo’s petition should be granted by virtue of Art. 26 (Par 2), FC?

HELD: NO. CA did not err in ruling that Manalo’s petition should be granted by virtue of Art. 26 (Par 2), FC?

  • Manalo’s petition is granted.
  • CA ruling partially affirm.
  1. A Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
    1. Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn
  2. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

G.R. No. 154380 : October 5 2005

Related Provision: Article 26, Par. 2, FC

FACTS:

  • 1981, Obrecido married Villanueva (both Filipino) in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter
  • 1986, Villanueva left for the United States bringing along their son.
  • A few years later, Obrecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
  • 2000, Obrecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married Stanley where they lived in California.
  • Obrecido thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26, FC. It is a declaratory relief
  • No opposition was filed. RTC ruled in favor of Obrecido, declaring him to be capacitated to remarry.
  • SolGon filed an MR but RTC denied.
  • SolGon filed a Petition for Review to assail the RTC Decision raising pure question of law.

ISSUE: WON RTC erred in ruling that Obrecido is capacitated to remarry by virtue of Article 26, Par. 2, FC?

HELD: NO. RTC did not err in ruling that Obrecido is capacitated to remarry by virtue of Article 26, Par. 2, FC.

  • Obrecido is capacitated to remarry.
  • RTC ruling sustained.
  1. Legislative intent is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.



In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

  • Applying the rule of reason, Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

DISPOSITIVE: Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

ROBERT SAN PEDRO VS. WILLY ONG

G.R. NO. 177598 : October 17 2008

Related Topic: Indispensable party, necessary party

  • 1996, San Pedro purchased from the spouses Narciso parcels of land evidenced by Deeds of Sale.
  • San Pedro hired the services of Dela Pena who is known to be very familiar with the intricacies of real property transfers.
  • San Pedro inquired with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan as to the status of his application for the issuance in his name of new TCTs for the subject properties.
  • He was surprised to find out, however, that the subject properties were still registered in the names of the Narciso spouses and were mortgaged to Willy Ong.
  • 1999, San Pedro filed a Petition for Nullification of Mortgage with Damages against the spouses Narciso, Dela Pena, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes.
    • In order to free the subject properties from the said encumbrances
  • RTC issued summons to spouses Narciso, Dela Peña, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes, directing them to file their Answers to San Pedro’s Petition
  • Caballes and Ong raised in their Joint Answerthe defense of mortgagee-in-good-faith. They claimed that they both relied in good faith on the SPAs granting Dela Peña.
  • RTC: Ruled in favor of San Pedro.
    • San Pedo is the legal and rightful owner of lands.
    • Mortgages constituted over the subject properties in Ong’s favor is null and void
    • SPA in favor of Dela Pena is null and void
    • Ordering the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan to cancel the recordings of mortgages in favor of Ong
    • Ordering [Ong] to return to [San Pedro] the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
  • Ong and Caballes filed an appeal to CA assigning as error the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of Dela Pena which rendered all the proceedings held before said court fatally defective.
  • CA: Reversed RTC ruling on the ground that service of summons on Dela Peña was invalid; thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Since Dela Peña was an indispensable party to the controversy, without her no final determination of the case can be had.
  • San Pedro filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before SC.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in finding Dela Peña as an indispensable party (which served as the basis of its dismissal of San Pedro’s complaint)?

HELD: YES. CA erred in finding Dela Peña as an indispensable party.

  • Dela Peña is not an indispensable party.
  • the crux of the controversy is the title of San Pedro to the subject properties vis-à-vis that of Ong, for the determination of which, Dela Peña’s participation is not an absolute necessity.
  • Her presence in the proceedings before the RTC would have only permitted complete relief since the said court could have already determined therein her liability for the damages she had caused to any of the parties, but it does not make her presence indispensable.
  • Hence, the proceedings held before RTC is valid.
  • RTC decision is reinstated with modifications (portion ordering Adora Dela Pena to pay Willy G. Ong the sum of P245,000.00 plus legal interest, is deleted)

NEWSWEEK VS. IAC

G.R. No. L-63559 : May 30 1986

Topic: Class suit

Facts:

  • Private respondents filed a Complaint for damages for 1M. The criminal complaint for libel was filed separately against Newsweek.
    • Private  respondents,  incorporated  associations  of  sugarcane  planters  in  Negros  Occidental filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province  against  Newsweek  Inc.  and  two  of  their  non-resident  correspondents/reporters,  Fred Bruning and Barry Came. 
    • The  complaint  alleged  that  petitioner  committed  libel  against  them  by  the  publication  of  the article  “An  Island  of  Fear”  in  their  magazine. 
    • The  article  supposedly  portrayed  the  island  as  a place  dominated  by  big  landowners  or  sugarcane  planters  who  exploited  the  impoverished sugarcane  laborers  and  brutalized  and  killed  them  with  impunity. 
    • They  claim  that  the  article showed  a  malicious  use  of  falsehood,  slanted  presentation    and  misrepresentation  of  facts, putting them in a bad light
  • They are comprised of 8,500 (number is complied with)
  • Newsweek, is a foreign corporation who publishes weekly magazine, filed a Motion to Dismiss for libel.
  • CFI Bacolod denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel.
  • IAC affirmed CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel.

ISSUE/S:

  1. WON IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel libel?
  2. WON the case is a class suit?

HELD:

  1. YES. IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel.
    • Private respondent’s Complaint for libel against Newsweek is dismissed.
  2. NO. The case not a class suit.
    • They do not have common or general interest in the subject matter (each other’s reputation)).
    • It is not a case where one or more may sure for the benefit of all. Or where the representation of class interest affected by the decree is indispensable to make each member an actual party.
    • In this case, the plaintiffs, have separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the controversy.
    • The disputed portion of the article that thet claim to be libelous never singled out plaintiff SOLA as a sugar planter. The report merely stated that the vicime has been arrested by members of special polic unit brought into the area by SOLA, the mayor of Kabankalan.
    • The report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm or privilege ans is proteted by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.