Author: jurist-prudence

TAN-ANDAL VS. ANDAL

G.R. No. 196359 | May 11, 2021

  1. State your understanding of psychological incapacity as a legal concept

Psychological incapacity as a legal concept consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. The law explicitly require that the psychological incapacity must be shown t have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Moreover, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

2. Are the 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity (juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability) still required? If so, did the definitions change under the new concept?

As For Juridical Antecedence, STILL REQUIRED

Under the new concept, the law explicitly require that the psychological incapacity must be shown t have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.

The definition of juridical antecedent was not changed under the new concept. It still means that the root of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before the marriage although its overt manifestations appear only after the wedding.

As For Gravity, NOT REQUIRED.

Under the new concept, psychological incapacity must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence. However, it is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a serious or dangerous illness. It is sufficient to prove that there  are mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts.

The definition of gravity is when the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work.

As For Incurability, STILL REQUIRED

Under the new concept, psychological incapacity is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner. Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. Not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable.

The definition of incurability is when the treatment required exceeds the ordinary means of the subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject.

3. Is psychological incapacity as a legal concept better than the medical concept previously used by the court (look at intention of the Commission when it adopted Art. 36 as a ground for nullify of marriage.

YES. Psychological incapacity as a legal concept is better than the medical concept previously used by the court. This is because the intention of the Commission when it adopted Art. 36 as a ground for nullify of marriage is not to categorize it a psychological incapacity.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly, Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The jurisprudential doctrine in Molina (medical concept of psychological incapacity) has unnecessarily imposed a view that is totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated. It worked liked a ‘strait-jacket’ on which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit in a rigid requirement. Hence, psychological incapacity as a legal concept is better than the medical concept previously used by the court.

LUISITO G. PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. NO. 220149 : JULY 27 2021

FACTS:

On September 5, 1983, then 16-year old Pulido married his 22-year old teacher Arcon in a civil ceremony. The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going hom.e to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31, 1995. Pulido and Baleda’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity had it not for the existing first marriage.

Aggrived, Arcon filed a bigamy complaint against Pulido and Baleda in December 2007. In his defense, Pulido argued that both of his marriages were null and invalid from the start and therefore he cannot be held liable for bigamy. In particular, his marriage to Arcon is null and void owing to a lack of a marriage license, and his marriage to Baleda is similarly null and void due to a lack of a wedding ceremony. Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she first learned about Pulido’s past marriage in April 2007, and that she submitted a Petition to Annul their Marriage before the bigamy lawsuit was filed. On October 25, 2007, the court pronounced their marriage null and invalid because they were bigamous. RTC convicted Pulido with bigamy and acquitted Baleda. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE/S:

  1. W/N a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code?
  2. W/N a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity?

HELD:

  1. YES. A judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other words, in order to remarry judicial declaration of nullity is :required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage having been obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first marriage.
  2. YES. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. in a criminal prosecution :for bigan1y, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Procedural rules are only given retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. In this case, Pulido may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (2006)

G.R. No. 129406 : March 6 2006

FACTS: One of the PCGG’s primary duties is to seize corporate operations, corporations, and other things thought to be ill-gotten money. The 227 shares of the Negros Occidental Golf & Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI), which were claimed to be owned by Roberto Benedicto, were one of these sequestrations. Following the sequestration of such shares, PCGG representatives served on the NOGCCI Board of Directors, which later approved the levy of a monthly membership fee of P150 per share on share owners. Later, the price was reduced to P250 per share.

Instead of rejecting such impositions, PCGG officials serving as Board of Directors authorized them. Between 1987 and 1989, PCGG representatives completely ignored the shares owing to either ineptitude or collaboration with other share owners, at which time PCGG’s inability to pay the monthly membership dues now totaling P2,959,471.00 resulted in the auction sale of the overdue shares.

The PCGG reached a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 on November 3, 1990. This agreement indicated that PCGG was releasing the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, meaning that said shares were not ill-gotten riches after all and that Benedicto was perfectly capable of purchasing said shares with his own money.

Since the signing of the Compromise Agreement, both the PCGG and Benedicto have sought the assistance of the Sandiganbayan in order to carry out the conditions of the agreement. Benedicto filed legal action against the Commission since PCGG did not appear to intend to release the shares to him as agreed. In every case, the Sandiganbayan ruled in Benedicto’s favor.

Following that, the PCGG filed the current petition with the Supreme Court, claiming that: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s directive on March 28, 1995 compelling PCGG to bring before the Clerk of Court the 227 shares registered in Benedicto’s name, or pay P150,000 per share using public money, and its ruling on March 13, 1997 denying PCGG’s Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, constituted grave abuse of discretion; and (b) PCGG is immune from any lawsuit.

ISSUE:

  1. W/N Sandiganbayan erred in ruling in favor of Benedicto?
  2. W/N PCGG is immune from lawsuit?

HELD:

  1. NO. The Court concluded that all of Sandiganbayan’s findings on the subject were in accordance with the Compromise Agreement reached between the PCGG and Benedicto. As a result, it cannot be criticized for just adhering to the conditions of something that PCGG had enacted. In fact, the Court decided that the two challenged judgements have a solid foundation in fact and law.
  2. NO. By entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the PCGG relinquished its immunity from litigation and placed itself on the same footing as its adversary. When the State, through its officers and agents, enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and in accordance with constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise, the State may be sued even without its express consent. The sovereign is reduced to the level of the citizen by entering into a contract.

UP V. DIZON

G.R. NO. 171182; AUGUST 23 2012

FACTS: The University of the Philippines (UP) signed a General Construction Agreement (GCA) with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and refurbishment of structures on the UP’s Los Bas campus. UP was able to pay both its first and second bills. However, the third invoice of P273,729.47 was not paid since it was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA). As a result, Stern Builders filed a lawsuit against the UP to recover the outstanding amount.

The RTC issued its ruling on November 28, 2001, ordering UP to compensate Stern Builders. The UP then filed a request for reconsideration on January 16, 2002. The motion was refused by the RTC. The rejection of the aforementioned motion was served on Atty. On May 17, 2002, Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office. Specifically, Atty. Nolasco was the OLS at Diliman, Quezon City, not the UP’s counsel of record.

Following that, on June 3, 2002, the UP filed a notice of appeal. The RTC, however, refused due process to the notice of appeal since it was submitted out of time. The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002, on the request of Stern Builders.

Both the CA and the High Court dismissed UP’s plea on appeal. The refusal became final and binding. As a result, Stern Builders filed a move for execution in the RTC, despite the fact that their earlier motion had already been approved and the writ of execution had already been issued. The RTC granted another request for execution filed on May 9, 2003 on June 11, 2003. (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). As a result, the sheriff issued garnishment orders on the UPs depositary banks, and the RTC ordered the cash to be released.

UP was aggrieved and took the case to the CA. The RTC was upheld by the CA. As a result, this petition.

ISSUES:

  1. W/N UP’s funds were validly garnished?
  2. W/N UP’s appeal dated June 3, 2002, filed late?
  1. NO. Because UP’s funds are government monies, they are not susceptible to garnishment. (Suability vs. responsibility of the State; garnishment of public monies). The Constitution stated unequivocally that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury unless in accordance of an appropriation authorized by legislation.” The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was under the main competence of the COA. It made no difference that the claim against the UP had previously been approved by a final and executory judgement.
  2. NO. The term of appeal did not begin until the decision was effectively served on counsel of record. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was served on Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffective since he was not the UP’s lawyer of record. The denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be lawfully served on the OLS at Diliman, and no other. It is established that if a party has appeared through counsel, service must be made on such counsel.

MANOTOC vs. CA

G.R. No. 130974 : August 16 2006

Topic: Valid substituted service of summons

FACTS:

  • Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment (Hawaii) in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207
    • for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
  • Manotoc is the defendant in Civil Case which seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment (Hawaii).
  • Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons to petitioner at Alexandra Homes.
  • Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier.
  • When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order.
  • 1993, Manotoc filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.
    • The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
  • 1994, RTC rejected Manotoc’s Motion To Dismiss. It relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
  • 1997, CA dismissed Manotoc’s Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (which sought to annull RTC Orders). It upheld RTC’s decision.
    • According to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court.
  • Manotoc filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45. He claimed that CA should have annulled the proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service of summons.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in holding that there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction?

HELD:

YES. CA erred in holding that there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction.

  • Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
  • In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person.
  • If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.”
  • Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
  • Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
  • Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
  • The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons out that “[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing.”

LACSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 128096 : January 20 1999

Topic: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

  • Eleven people alleged to be part of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime group known for bank robberies, were killed by anti-bank robbery and intelligence task force personnel (ABRITG). Petitioners and petitioner-intervenors were among those included in the ABRITG.
  • In response to a media report by SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command that the incident was a summary execution rather than a shoot-out between Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto convened a panel of investigators to look into the matter. The incident was determined to be a lawful police operation by the panel. However, a review board overturned the panel’s decision and suggested that twenty-six respondents be prosecuted with multiple murder, including the petitioner, who was charged as the principal, and the petitioner-intervenors, who were charged as accessories.
  • The Ombudsman filed amended information before the Sandiganbayan after a re-investigation, in which petitioner was only charged as an accessory.
  • The defendants filed separate motions challenging the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, claiming that under the modified informations, the cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
    • They argue that the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is limited to instances involving one or more “primary accused” who are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. As a result, they did not meet the requirements. However, until their motions are resolved, R.A. 8249, which modifies the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by removing the word “principal” from the phrase “primary accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
  • The petitioner calls into doubt the legality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, includes Section 7, which states that the legislation would apply to all matters pending in any court that have not commenced trial as of the date of approval.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case. NO. Lacking proof.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute. NO. Applied to all pending cases.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction. NO. Not in the exercise of duty.

HELD:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

JAIME J. ARAZA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 247429: September 08 2020

Offense Involved: Anti-Violence Against Women and Children

FACTS: On October 5, 1989, AAA married Araza. Initially and at the onset of their marriage, her husband Araza was hardworking, loving and faithful. She had no marital issues with Araza until he went to Zamboanga City in February 2007, for their networking business. It was at this point that she began to notice Araza’s change in behavior. One day, she received a text telling that her husband is having an affair with their best friend. She went to see it for herself and was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman, a certain Tessie Luy Fabillar. She instituted a complaint against her husband Araza and his alleged mistress, for Concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza again lived with AAA. However, it was only for a short time. Without saying a word, Araza left AAA on November 22, 2007. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again. In the days to come, she would receive text messages from her husband’s supposed mistress using various numbers. The messages would tell her that Araza is sick and needed money for medicines. There was also another text message threatening her that she will kill AAA’s husband. Because of this, she sought legal services believing that Araza’s liberty was being restrained by Fabillar. Based on the investigation, Araza left their conjugal abode on his own volition and he has been living with his mistress, as husband and wife. As a matter of fact, three children were born out of their cohabitation. The truth caused AAA emotional and psychological suffering. An information for crime of violence against women under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 was filed in RTC Las Pinas City. RTC ruled in favor of AAA. This was affirmed by the CA. Aggrieved, Aaraza filed this present case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 although his conviction was based on facts not alleged in the Information?
  2. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the acts allegedly committed by Araza?

HELD:

  1. No. The elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were sufficiently alleged in the Information. In this case the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender Araza; (2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering is inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and had three illegitimate children with her.
  • No. The CA was correct in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering. The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BULU CHOWDURY

G.R. No. 129577-80: February 15 2000

Offense Involved: Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

FACTS: Sometime in 1994, Sasis, Calleja, and Miranda applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for employment in South Korea. Bulu Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview, Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment and required him to pass the necessary documents and pay the processing fees which were collected by Josephine Ong.  Chowdury was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The complainants also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already expired. For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency’s President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency’s Managing Director. The trial Court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in largescale. Aggrieved,  Chowdury filed this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not trial court erred in finding Chowdury guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale?

HELD:

  1. Yes. Trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Chowdury is not guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade’s failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Their payments were received by the agency’s cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335: February 18 2014

Topic: Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012

FACTS: On September 12, 2012, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 was approved. The law aimed to address legal issues concerning online interactions and the Internet in the Philippines. It penalizes illegal acts done via the Internet that were not covered by old laws. However, the act received criticisms for its provision criminalizing libel, which is perceived to be a curtailment of the freedom of expression. Hence, consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court to question the constitutionality of several provisions of the act. Focusing on the libel aspect, petitioners claim that the libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel, insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article, is constitutional?

HELD:

  1. Yes. Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel is constitutional. The Court ruled that Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. It explained that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.  The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.

MIRIAM ARMI JAO YU VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 134172: September 20 2004

Offense Involved: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22

FACTS: Miriam Armi Jao Yu issued nineteen checks to the prejudice of Susan Andaya. Aggrieved, Susan Andaya filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with nineteen counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision finding her guilty of the charges and imposing upon her hefty fines, indemnities, and subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine in each of the cases and to pay the costs of suit.  Miriam Armi Jao Yu filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals arguing that an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may not be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision. Hence this case.

ISSUE/S:

  1. Whether an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court?

HELD:

  1. Yes. An accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 may be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the court. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the RPC. The absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations. Moreover, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 which clarified the imposition of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the fine he is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the Circular states that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court, “there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.”