Month: March 2022

TAN-ANDAL VS. ANDAL

G.R. No. 196359 | May 11, 2021

  1. State your understanding of psychological incapacity as a legal concept

Psychological incapacity as a legal concept consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. The law explicitly require that the psychological incapacity must be shown t have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Moreover, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

2. Are the 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity (juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability) still required? If so, did the definitions change under the new concept?

As For Juridical Antecedence, STILL REQUIRED

Under the new concept, the law explicitly require that the psychological incapacity must be shown t have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.

The definition of juridical antecedent was not changed under the new concept. It still means that the root of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before the marriage although its overt manifestations appear only after the wedding.

As For Gravity, NOT REQUIRED.

Under the new concept, psychological incapacity must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence. However, it is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a serious or dangerous illness. It is sufficient to prove that there  are mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts.

The definition of gravity is when the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work.

As For Incurability, STILL REQUIRED

Under the new concept, psychological incapacity is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner. Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. Not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable.

The definition of incurability is when the treatment required exceeds the ordinary means of the subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject.

3. Is psychological incapacity as a legal concept better than the medical concept previously used by the court (look at intention of the Commission when it adopted Art. 36 as a ground for nullify of marriage.

YES. Psychological incapacity as a legal concept is better than the medical concept previously used by the court. This is because the intention of the Commission when it adopted Art. 36 as a ground for nullify of marriage is not to categorize it a psychological incapacity.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly, Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The jurisprudential doctrine in Molina (medical concept of psychological incapacity) has unnecessarily imposed a view that is totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated. It worked liked a ‘strait-jacket’ on which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit in a rigid requirement. Hence, psychological incapacity as a legal concept is better than the medical concept previously used by the court.

LUISITO G. PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. NO. 220149 : JULY 27 2021

FACTS:

On September 5, 1983, then 16-year old Pulido married his 22-year old teacher Arcon in a civil ceremony. The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going hom.e to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31, 1995. Pulido and Baleda’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity had it not for the existing first marriage.

Aggrived, Arcon filed a bigamy complaint against Pulido and Baleda in December 2007. In his defense, Pulido argued that both of his marriages were null and invalid from the start and therefore he cannot be held liable for bigamy. In particular, his marriage to Arcon is null and void owing to a lack of a marriage license, and his marriage to Baleda is similarly null and void due to a lack of a wedding ceremony. Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she first learned about Pulido’s past marriage in April 2007, and that she submitted a Petition to Annul their Marriage before the bigamy lawsuit was filed. On October 25, 2007, the court pronounced their marriage null and invalid because they were bigamous. RTC convicted Pulido with bigamy and acquitted Baleda. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE/S:

  1. W/N a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code?
  2. W/N a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity?

HELD:

  1. YES. A judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other words, in order to remarry judicial declaration of nullity is :required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage having been obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first marriage.
  2. YES. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. in a criminal prosecution :for bigan1y, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Procedural rules are only given retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. In this case, Pulido may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (2006)

G.R. No. 129406 : March 6 2006

FACTS: One of the PCGG’s primary duties is to seize corporate operations, corporations, and other things thought to be ill-gotten money. The 227 shares of the Negros Occidental Golf & Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI), which were claimed to be owned by Roberto Benedicto, were one of these sequestrations. Following the sequestration of such shares, PCGG representatives served on the NOGCCI Board of Directors, which later approved the levy of a monthly membership fee of P150 per share on share owners. Later, the price was reduced to P250 per share.

Instead of rejecting such impositions, PCGG officials serving as Board of Directors authorized them. Between 1987 and 1989, PCGG representatives completely ignored the shares owing to either ineptitude or collaboration with other share owners, at which time PCGG’s inability to pay the monthly membership dues now totaling P2,959,471.00 resulted in the auction sale of the overdue shares.

The PCGG reached a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 on November 3, 1990. This agreement indicated that PCGG was releasing the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, meaning that said shares were not ill-gotten riches after all and that Benedicto was perfectly capable of purchasing said shares with his own money.

Since the signing of the Compromise Agreement, both the PCGG and Benedicto have sought the assistance of the Sandiganbayan in order to carry out the conditions of the agreement. Benedicto filed legal action against the Commission since PCGG did not appear to intend to release the shares to him as agreed. In every case, the Sandiganbayan ruled in Benedicto’s favor.

Following that, the PCGG filed the current petition with the Supreme Court, claiming that: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s directive on March 28, 1995 compelling PCGG to bring before the Clerk of Court the 227 shares registered in Benedicto’s name, or pay P150,000 per share using public money, and its ruling on March 13, 1997 denying PCGG’s Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, constituted grave abuse of discretion; and (b) PCGG is immune from any lawsuit.

ISSUE:

  1. W/N Sandiganbayan erred in ruling in favor of Benedicto?
  2. W/N PCGG is immune from lawsuit?

HELD:

  1. NO. The Court concluded that all of Sandiganbayan’s findings on the subject were in accordance with the Compromise Agreement reached between the PCGG and Benedicto. As a result, it cannot be criticized for just adhering to the conditions of something that PCGG had enacted. In fact, the Court decided that the two challenged judgements have a solid foundation in fact and law.
  2. NO. By entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the PCGG relinquished its immunity from litigation and placed itself on the same footing as its adversary. When the State, through its officers and agents, enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and in accordance with constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise, the State may be sued even without its express consent. The sovereign is reduced to the level of the citizen by entering into a contract.

UP V. DIZON

G.R. NO. 171182; AUGUST 23 2012

FACTS: The University of the Philippines (UP) signed a General Construction Agreement (GCA) with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and refurbishment of structures on the UP’s Los Bas campus. UP was able to pay both its first and second bills. However, the third invoice of P273,729.47 was not paid since it was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA). As a result, Stern Builders filed a lawsuit against the UP to recover the outstanding amount.

The RTC issued its ruling on November 28, 2001, ordering UP to compensate Stern Builders. The UP then filed a request for reconsideration on January 16, 2002. The motion was refused by the RTC. The rejection of the aforementioned motion was served on Atty. On May 17, 2002, Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office. Specifically, Atty. Nolasco was the OLS at Diliman, Quezon City, not the UP’s counsel of record.

Following that, on June 3, 2002, the UP filed a notice of appeal. The RTC, however, refused due process to the notice of appeal since it was submitted out of time. The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002, on the request of Stern Builders.

Both the CA and the High Court dismissed UP’s plea on appeal. The refusal became final and binding. As a result, Stern Builders filed a move for execution in the RTC, despite the fact that their earlier motion had already been approved and the writ of execution had already been issued. The RTC granted another request for execution filed on May 9, 2003 on June 11, 2003. (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). As a result, the sheriff issued garnishment orders on the UPs depositary banks, and the RTC ordered the cash to be released.

UP was aggrieved and took the case to the CA. The RTC was upheld by the CA. As a result, this petition.

ISSUES:

  1. W/N UP’s funds were validly garnished?
  2. W/N UP’s appeal dated June 3, 2002, filed late?
  1. NO. Because UP’s funds are government monies, they are not susceptible to garnishment. (Suability vs. responsibility of the State; garnishment of public monies). The Constitution stated unequivocally that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury unless in accordance of an appropriation authorized by legislation.” The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was under the main competence of the COA. It made no difference that the claim against the UP had previously been approved by a final and executory judgement.
  2. NO. The term of appeal did not begin until the decision was effectively served on counsel of record. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was served on Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffective since he was not the UP’s lawyer of record. The denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be lawfully served on the OLS at Diliman, and no other. It is established that if a party has appeared through counsel, service must be made on such counsel.